

# State-Run Islamic Schools and Political Islam\*

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## Abstract

This paper studies the impact of the establishment of state-run Islamic schools during the 1970s on electoral outcomes in Turkey. Exploiting the variation in exposure to Islamic schools across district centers and election years, I find that district centers with an Islamic school voted significantly more for Islamist parties after exposure to Islamic schools. The effect appears after prolonged exposure to Islamic schools, once affected student cohorts came of voting age. The faster increase in Islamist support is more pronounced in district centers with initial lower attachment to secularist parties that were right-wing strongholds. Last, I provide evidence that the differential increase in support for Islamist parties was not driven by Islamic brotherhoods, geographic sorting, or economic liberalization. My findings indicate that policymakers with religious affiliations can utilize religious schooling as centers for the promotion of religious politics to achieve electoral success in secular electoral democracies.

**JEL Classification:** P16, Z12

**Keywords:** Religion, Education, Election, Politics, Islam

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# 1 Introduction

For centuries, religious institutions enjoyed a monopoly over the provision of education to successive generations of religious adherents. However, beginning in the 19th century, many states introduced secular mass schooling and compulsory schooling laws. Apart from secular education's role in economic development and industrialization (Squicciarini, 2020), an essential function of this mass schooling was to support the nation-building efforts of the political elite (Alesina et al., 2021; Ansell and Lindvall, 2013; Bandiera et al., 2019; Paglayan, 2021; Ramirez and Boli, 1987). Since then, the provision of religious education has been a central issue in politics. A recent ruling on public funding of religious schools by the United States Supreme Court and the state-driven promotion of religious schooling in several countries, including Turkey and Hungary, are notable recent examples on the matter.<sup>1</sup>

Recent studies show that Islamic institutions, including mosques and traditional Islamic school networks run by (potentially apolitical) religious organizations, can boost Islamism and support for Islamist parties in the long run in the Indonesian context (Bazzi et al., 2020a,b). However, religious schools also exist in democracies that are relatively more secular and are sponsored by political actors using state funds. In such a context, less is known about whether access to religious schools—promoted by state actors with political affiliations—can affect electoral outcomes and boost support for political parties with religious platforms.

This paper studies the consequences of access to state-run Islamic secondary schools during the 1970s on electoral outcomes in Turkey. Turkey offers an interesting case study for the question at hand with its historically strict secular institutions and notably conservative population. A candidate country for European Union membership, and once posited as a model among Muslim-majority countries for its secular institutions

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<sup>1</sup>In 2020, The Supreme Court of the United States ruled in *Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue* that states can't exclude religious schools from receiving tuition funding simply because they are religious, in a 5-4 vote divided across ideological lines.

and electoral democracy, Turkey has turned into an electoral autocracy under the Islamist Justice and Development Party rule, according to a recent report by the V-Dem Institute. In this paper, I provide novel empirical evidence that state-run Islamic schools were one of the significant driving forces behind the success of Islamist parties in the 1990s in Turkey.

In 1925, after the foundation of the Turkish republic, Islamic schools were abolished to secularize the education system. The monopoly of secular schooling was shattered in 1950 when state-run Islamic schooling was reintroduced. However, the first Islamic schools were established in highly populated province-centers with a single institution per locality, limiting access to these schools. Islamic schools expanded rapidly into relatively less populated district centers during the 1970s. To isolate the impact of exposure to Islamic schools on electoral outcomes, I exploit the expansion of the Islamic school network in the 1970s in a difference-in-differences framework by comparing the electoral results in district centers with and without an Islamic school over the period between 1969 and 1995.

My main focus is the impact of Islamic schools on Islamist party vote shares. I find that district centers with an Islamic school experienced a faster increase in their Islamist party vote share than district centers without such schools. I find no effect in the first election held right after the school expansion in 1977, indicating that the opening of Islamic schools was not effective in attracting votes for the Islamist party in the very short run. The effect started to emerge with prolonged exposure to Islamic schools, after the schools' first students came of voting age, allowing sufficient time for local mobilization. In the most conservative specification, the increase in Islamist party vote share after exposure is, on average, 1.8 percentage points, or about 15% relative to the mean. The magnitude of the treatment effect is substantial, as it explains about 30% of the surge in Islamic party support in treated district centers between 1973 and 1995. A heterogeneity analysis of the treatment effect further reveals that the impact of Islamic

school access is higher for right-wing strongholds and localities with a lower attachment to secularist parties.

Overall, secularist center-left parties experienced a faster decline in their vote shares in treated district centers, while conservative right-wing vote shares remained largely unaffected. I also find a slight increase in the voter turnout rate. However, there is notable heterogeneity in the dynamics of the treatment effect over election years for outcomes other than Islamist party vote share. Nevertheless, the Islamist party managed to shrink its vote margin vis-à-vis established parties. Last, I rule out several other alternative explanations that may be related to increasing support for the Islamist party in treated district centers and provide further robustness checks. These explanations include increased visibility of Islamic brotherhoods in public life, economic liberalization, and geographic sorting.

This paper contributes to the extensive literature in the political science and economics disciplines on the provision of education as a nation-building tool to design younger generations' political beliefs and attitudes ([Alesina et al., 2021](#); [Ansell, 2010](#); [Cantoni et al., 2017](#); [Paglayan, 2021](#); [Voigtländer and Voth, 2015](#)). More specifically, this paper contributes to the scant literature on the provision of religious educational institutions and its link with political outcomes. A few studies investigate shocks to the supply of religious institutions in the Indonesian context. Examining a land reform in the 1960s within a difference-in-discontinuity design, [Bazzi et al. \(2020a\)](#) find an increase in the supply of religious institutions, including mosques and traditional Islamic schools run by nonstate Islamic organizations, in areas affected by the reform. These areas also exhibited higher support for Islamist parties about forty years after the reform. In another study, [Bazzi et al. \(2020b\)](#) show that the private Islamic schooling sector reacted to a major primary school construction program (SD INPRES) in the 1970s by increasing the supply of religious schools to absorb the demand for secondary education. They further show that cohorts affected by the INPRES program displayed greater religiosity,

suggesting an ideological backlash to the secularization effort. My paper contributes to this literature by disentangling the role of Islamic schools with an examination of a specific policy change that exclusively enabled Islamic school access. Unlike the authors of these studies, I examine the role of modern, state-run Islamic schools—promoted by political entities—in a secular electoral democratic context. I further provide evidence on the short- and medium-run dynamics of the impact of Islamic school access on electoral outcomes. My findings shed light on the incentive of political actors with religious affiliations to promote religious education to achieve electoral success. Any link between religious schooling and political behavior would have important implications for a ruling power seeking to make new policies and institutions favorable to religious politics.

## 2 Conceptual Framework

In this section, I provide several plausible mechanisms through which access to Islamic schools might boost support for Islamist parties. Although there is extensive literature on religion and voting behavior in Europe and North America ([Esmer and Pettersson, 2007](#); [Manza and Wright, 2003](#)), this stream is less developed with reference to Muslim countries. With the rise and success of Islamist parties in the last couple of decades, there is an increasing interest in identifying the reasons for this phenomenon. Previous literature lays out several possible explanations for why there may be an Islamist political advantage. Among others, major explanations include ideological advantages, organizational capacity, and demographic associations and clientelism (see [Cammett and Luong \(2014\)](#), [Pepinsky et al. \(2012\)](#), and [Livny \(2020\)](#) for detailed discussions of several theories on this topic). Here, I argue that Islamic schools act as an enabling force to mobilize Islamic movements and enhance Islamist party support through the aforementioned mechanisms.

Ideology is one of the most commonly identified explanations for the mass appeal of Islamist parties in Muslim countries due to the clear connection between religious identity and voting behavior. According to this argument, an individual's religious preferences play an essential role in her voting behavior. Islamist parties try to attract religious voters by justifying their political agenda as religiously correct and claim to occupy the moral high ground (Kepel, 2002). There is also a large literature in the political economy of education that focuses on the role of educational institutions in transmitting values and beliefs. This literature suggests that educational institutions can be used as an effective way to influence the identity of children and teenagers (Cantoni et al., 2017; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015). Therefore, Islamic schools can enhance students' religious identity by inculcating them with Islamic beliefs and values. In turn, strengthening voters' religious identity and preferences may boost the popularity of Islamist parties.

Another leading explanation for Islamist party support is the relative advantage of Islamist movements in terms of organizational capacity. This explanation attributes allegedly more efficient and sustainable organizational structures to Islamist parties relative to others. On the one hand, Islamic parties may enjoy easier access to material resources that support the welfare of religious communities, including mosques, Islamic schools, and charities. On the other hand, they can use these institutions as recruitment and propaganda centers for their movements. A distinct advantage of Islamic schools over other types of institutions is the function of developing human capital that can provide educated human resources for Islamist parties. Islamic schools may also produce more dedicated cadres and sympathizers of Islamic movements by decreasing recruitment costs due to strengthened religious identity (Bazzi et al., 2020a; Harmsen, 2008). Students or graduates recruited from Islamic schools can provide a young and dynamic human resource facilitating Islamic movements' local mobilization.

Finally, demographic association can play an essential role in the voting behavior of individuals with Islamic school backgrounds. Islamist parties are more likely than other

parties to nominate Islamic school graduates (Ozgur, 2012). This may create a unique sense of unity and trust, namely, as a participant of Islamic schools, in addition to that generated by a shared religious identity. Therefore, an individual who attended Islamic schools may simply vote for Islamist parties due to in-group bias or interpersonal trust. This phenomenon is well documented in the psychological and political science literatures (Huddy and Khatib, 2007; Livny, 2020). Moreover, Islamic school graduates voting according to their Islamic school allegiances may be rewarded with privileges and positions in public institutions as a form of patronage provided by Islamist networks within the government (Ayata, 1996). Political clientelism in exchange for votes is common practice among Islamist movements in Muslim countries (Brooke, 2019; Cammett and Issar, 2010; Hamayotsu, 2012; Wickham, 2002). Islamic schools can form a clientelistic relationship between Islamist parties and the religious communities that value Islamic education. Individuals may use an Islamic school degree as a signaling tool to obtain personal favors—jobs, procurement contracts, welfare support, and so forth—in exchange for Islamist electoral support. Taken all together, these arguments indicate that Islamic schools may work as grassroots arms of Islamist parties by promoting Islamic politics and enabling local mobilization of religious adherents.

### **3 Institutional Background**

#### **3.1 Brief History of Islamist Politics and Islamic Schools in Turkey**

The Republic of Turkey was founded in 1923 as a single-party system, and secularization was one of the founding Republican People's Party's (RPP's) main pillars. Although the RPP included a few religious figures among its cadres to avoid dissent from religious adherents in public, it largely kept religion away from state affairs and politics. However, religion was still an important factor in people's daily lives, and an enthusiasm to see Islam represented in politics was alive and well. By 1925, the Sheikh

Said rebellion had erupted in eastern Turkey. The reintroduction of the Islamic caliphate and sultanate in Turkey was one of the aims of the uprising. Following the rebellion's suppression, the government intensified its secularization efforts and convinced itself that Turkish society was not democratically mature enough for a multiparty system. Closure of Islamic schools was one of the many secularization interventions implemented during these years. The single-party system remained intact, barring a few exceptional periods, until 1945. The global wave of democratization at the end of World War II also affected the Turkish republic. Turkey was transformed into a multiparty democracy with the 1946 general elections. The Democratic Party (DP), founded by the right-wing conservative faction within the RPP, won the first fair multiparty elections in 1950. One of the first things the DP achieved after coming into power was to reintroduce Islamic schooling, proclaiming a need to train imams and preachers for mosques. However, the initial number of Islamic schools remained limited as they were established as one school per highly populated province-center. Several parties with a clear Islamist agenda were also formed during the 1950s, yet they were short-lived and shut down by the judiciary, which cited their reactionary religious activities. Therefore, Islamist movements remained mainly a faction within the mainstream right-wing parties—the Democratic Party and its successor, the Justice Party (JP)—and pro-Islam nationalist parties, including the Nation Party (NP).


Political Islam had experienced a sharp rise throughout the Muslim world by the end of the 1960s. The strictly secular Turkish republic was no exception. Following a dispute with the leadership of the JP regarding nominations, the Islamist factions within the JP and NP formed the “Independents’ Movement” under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan to present independent candidates in the 1969 elections in twelve provinces. Prior to the election, Erbakan published a manifesto called “Milli Görüş” (National Outlook), which later also gave its name to the movement, essentially focusing on economy- and development-related issues with a localist focus. The role of Islam in state



affairs and daily life was also a general topic of the manifesto. Out of 12 independent candidates, only Erbakan qualified to enter parliament. However, public interest during the campaign period and the desire of Islamic brotherhoods to see Islam represented in politics led to the formation of the National Order Party (NOP) by Erbakan and fellows in 1970. This was the beginning of an era in which, in the decades to come, Islam would come to dominate Turkey's political landscape. Again, however, this first attempt by Milli Görüs to politicize Islam under a party failed when the Constitutional Court shut it down after the 1971 military memorandum, citing antiseccular acts. The year after, to succeed the NOP, Milli Görüs founded the National Salvation Party (NSP)—the first party to successfully espouse Islamist politics in Turkey.

Milli Görüs started to assume an important place on Turkey's political scene after the 1973 elections. The NSP received a surprising 11.8% vote share, and 48 of its candidates entered parliament. Between 1973 and 1980, when mainstream parties failed to achieve a majority to form a government, the NSP participated in several coalitions with both mainstream center-right and center-left parties. This helped the party achieve some of its Islamist agenda, although its vote share remained modest during this period. One of the most prominent achievements of the NSP was enabling the rapid expansion of the Islamic school network during coalition talks as seen in Figure 1. Another significant milestone for Islamic schooling was a Council of State ruling in 1976 that granted the legal right for girl students to attend these schools (see Benzer (2021) for a detailed discussion of the Islamic school expansion, court ruling, and Islamic schools). Following the political turmoil during the late 1970s, the military took control with the 1980 coup d'état, and all political parties were shut down, including the Islamist NSP.

**Figure 1: Evolution of Islamic School Numbers**



*Notes:* Panel a shows the distribution of opening years of all Islamic lower secondary schools in Turkey. Panel b shows the total number of open Islamic lower secondary schools in Turkey in a given year.

After the transition to civilian rule in 1983, Milli Görüs reorganized under the name of the Welfare Party (WP). In its first general election in 1987, the WP failed to enter parliament with its vote share of 7.20% since it remained under the 10% election threshold. The Turkish political scene in the 1990s was marked by an unexpected success of the WP that led it to power in Turkey. Allying with conservative nationalist parties in the 1991 elections, it received 16.9% of votes and entered parliament with 62 representatives. Another surprising result came in the municipal elections of 1994. The WP drew significant attention in Turkish politics when it acquired control of several municipalities, including the two largest and most developed cities, Istanbul and Ankara. This paved the way for the WP to arise as the winner of the 1995 general elections, earning a 21.4% vote share and 158 seats. Fifty-four of its MPs were graduates of Islamic schools, constituting a significant portion of the party's parliamentary seats. The WP's grassroots organizations, supported by the cadres from Islamic schools, were essential in its success during the 1990s (Ayata, 1996; Ozgur, 2012).<sup>2</sup> Women's organizations also played an essential role in the Islamist party's local mobilization, as they effectively reached conservative women due to strongly traditional gender norms

<sup>2</sup>Anecdotally, many Islamic school alumni questioned during this period attested that the WP and later the Justice and Development Party (JDP) represented their platform (Ozgur, 2012; Pak, 2004)

in Islam ([Arat, 2012](#)). Islamists achieved a significant milestone in 1996 when the WP led a coalition government with the center-right party True Path Party (TPP) that lasted one year. For the first time in the history of the Turkish republic, an Islamist party held the reins of power.

The Welfare Party's rule floundered a year later following a military memorandum in 1997. The Turkish military leadership strongly criticized the WP's pro-Islamic acts and made several policy decisions to be implemented immediately. Islamic schooling was the target of the main article in the military memorandum. The army leadership requested the introduction of eight-year compulsory education, the abolition of lower secondary-level Islamic schools, and the shutdown of several recently opened Islamic schools. Failing to fulfill the army's requests, the WP-TPP coalition government fell apart. The WP was disbanded by the constitutional court in 1998 for violating the constitution's laicism clause. The newly formed government led by Mesut Yilmaz later applied these requests, and Islamic schools experienced an enormous blow. Although the WP era was over in Turkish politics, a faction within Milli Görüş called the "reformists" forged the core of the populist Islamist Justice and Development Party (JDP) led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which won the 2002 early elections and have held ruling power since then. After ten years in power, the JDP reintroduced lower secondary-level Islamic schools and expanded the Islamic school network considerably, intending to raise pious generations that will support its cause ([Gall, 2018](#)).

### **3.2 Election System**

Since the 1969 elections, general elections in Turkey have been conducted under a closed party-list proportional representation system characterized by the d'Hondt method. Starting with the 1983 elections, an election threshold of 10% was introduced. Members of parliament are elected from electoral districts, which share names and borders with provinces. Anyone who fulfills the constitutional requirements and wishes to run for

office can apply to parties to run in their lists or can run independently. Turkey has a tradition of strong party leaders who hold sole power over party management. Therefore, party leaders and top management committees decide on party lists and list rankings. As provincial party branches manage and supervise local election campaigns at the district level, they play an essential role in reaching the people. The voting age is 18 in Turkey. Turkish women gained full universal suffrage in 1934 and have since shared the same rights as men. Although women widely utilize their voting rights by casting ballots, women's representation in political office is low in Turkey.

## 4 Empirical Analysis

### 4.1 Data and Descriptive Evidence

To analyze the impact of access to Islamic schools on election outcomes, I combine data from two main sources. First, I obtain data on the locations and opening years of Islamic schools collected manually from various websites. I also cross-check Islamic schools' locations from a source that contains location information on all Islamic schools in 1991 (Özüdoğru, 1991). Second, I obtain district center-level electoral data for parliamentary elections between 1969 and 2018 from the Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK).<sup>3</sup> Since Islamic schools were available only in district centers, I focus on electoral outcomes at the district center level and do not include rural areas in my analysis. I combine district centers with greater-city status and divide them afterwards when I cannot disaggregate the election data. As there were Islamic schools that opened before the expansion of the 1970s and thus the corresponding areas were always treated, I exclude them from my analysis.<sup>4</sup> I end up with 813 district centers to be included in the analysis. Table 1 presents summary statistics of several district center characteristics used in my analysis.

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<sup>3</sup>I use data shared by Livny (2020) for the elections starting from 1991. For previous elections, I use ballot-level data to aggregate electoral outcomes at the district center level.

<sup>4</sup>Yet, I show as a robustness check that results remain similar when I include them as treated.

**Table 1: Summary Statistics**

	Without Islamic School					With Islamic School				
	Obs.	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.	Obs.	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.
1973 Islamist Vote	512	10.46	0.00	74.76	11.13	301	10.44	0.14	41.42	7.77
1973 Conservative Vote	512	52.09	0.5	94.06	16.63	301	51.00	2.76	89.47	14.95
1973 Secularist Vote	512	33.32	0.39	91.46	16.79	301	37.71	1.15	85.26	14.51
1973 Turnout	512	64.02	23.16	101.32	10.12	301	63.74	5.96	87.40	8.59
1970 Population	512	6638	351	250605	18427	301	18906	1318	653290	51432
1990 Population	512	14626	802	506477	41090	301	43121	2250	1328276	126210
Province Capital	512	0.03	0	1	0.18	301	0.06	0	1	0.24

*Notes:* This table reports district center-level characteristics based on the 1970 and 1990 population censuses and 1973 general elections data.

I classify political parties into three main categories. The first and foremost category of interest consists of Islamist parties. This category includes mainly parties formed by the Milli Görüs movement and its split-offs. The Milli Görüs movement started to participate in elections under the umbrella of a political party beginning with the 1973 elections. However, there were other parties that shared the Islamists' focus and had characteristics similar to those of the Milli Görüs parties prior to 1973, including the Justice Party and the Nation Party. For the 1969 election, I classify the Nation Party and independent candidates in nine provinces that Milli Görüs ran after a disagreement with Justice Party leadership as Islamist.<sup>5 6</sup> The second category consists of center-right and nationalist parties that are conservative in social terms. The third category comprises center-left parties that are prosecutorialist and socially liberal.


Figure 2 displays the raw data on several electoral outcomes of interest by Islamic school availability, including the mean vote share for different party classifications, voter

<sup>5</sup>Those seven provinces are Adana, Adapazari, Ankara, Aydin, Balikesir, Cankiri, Istanbul, Izmir and Maras. Although there may be other independent candidates from other political views, Islamists was the main body of independents that gathered votes in those provinces. Nevertheless, leaving independents out in my classification do not change the results for Islamist party as seen in section 5.4

<sup>6</sup>Appendix Figure A.2 shows the positive relationship between the 1969 election vote shares of the Nation Party and independent candidates, and 1973 Islamist party vote shares. However, there was no relationship between the 1969 conservative and 1973 Islamist vote shares. This is a supportive evidence for my Islamist party classification for the 1969 elections.

turnout, and the margins of other parties against Islamists, over the six parliamentary elections in Turkey held between 1969 and 1995. The mean vote shares for Islamist parties followed a similar pattern in district centers with and without an Islamic school before 1991 and were stable over elections. Islamist parties experienced, overall, a sharp increase in their votes shares in the 1991 and 1995 elections. The mean increase was larger in district centers with an Islamic school than in other district centers. While the vote shares for conservative parties experienced an increasing trend in both types of district centers, center-left parties experienced a stable decrease starting from the 1980s.

**Figure 2: Evolution of Electoral Outcomes – Raw Data**



*Notes:* This figure presents the raw mean trends in electoral outcomes across election years for district centers with and without an Islamic school.

## 4.2 Empirical Strategy

To evaluate the impact of access to Islamic schools on electoral outcomes, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy and exploit only within-district-center variation over time. The empirical specification takes the form:

$$y_{pdt} = \beta(Post_t \times Islamic_{pd}) + X_{d0}\theta_t + \eta_{pt} + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{pdt}, \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{pdt}$  is the vote share (in percentage points) for the different party classifications or the voter turnout rate in district center  $d$  of province  $p$  in election-year  $t$ , where  $t = 1969, 1973, 1977, 1987, 1991$ , or  $1995$ .  $Islamic_d$  is a dummy indicating Islamic school availability in district center  $d$  in 1980.  $Post_t$  is a dummy that takes value 1 for elections held in 1987 or later and value 0 for previous elections. In my main specification, I exclude the 1977 election, yet I also present specifications coding the 1977 election as post- or pre-treatment period in appendix tables 1 and 2.<sup>7</sup>  $\gamma_d$  and  $\delta_t$  represent district center and election-year fixed effects, respectively. In some specifications, I replace  $\delta_t$  with  $\eta_{pt}$ , which represents province-by-year fixed effects.  $X_{d0}$  is a full set of pretreatment observable characteristics of district centers. These characteristics include population size, a measure for market access and political controls —the 1973 vote shares of each parties and turnout rates— and all interacted with election-year dummies.

The specification reported in Equation 1 allows me to account for various sources of potential endogeneity. In particular, district center fixed effects account for any time-invariant district center characteristics. Election-year fixed effects capture any shocks common to all district centers in a given election year. Province-by-year fixed effects control for province-specific shocks common to all district centers in a given election year. Finally, the inclusion of pretreatment characteristics interacted with year

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<sup>7</sup>Although many schools were already opened prior to 1977 elections, the estimate for the 1977 election would only capture the opening effect, as the exposure to schools were fresh and many possible exposure channels were still not in action. Yet, the results are quantitatively similar for all those specifications.

dummies allows those characteristics to have differential effects on electoral outcomes over election years. Standard errors are clustered at the district center level.

The key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences specification is that vote shares in district centers with and without an Islamic school would have followed parallel trends in the absence of access to Islamic schools. Under the parallel trends assumption and in the absence of time-varying confounding factors, the estimated  $\beta$  is the coefficient of interest, which reflects the average causal effect of access to Islamic schools on electoral outcomes. Although the parallel trends assumption is untestable, the absence of pretrends would provide supportive evidence for identification. To investigate pretrends as well as the dynamic evolution of the treatment effect, I also estimate an event-study specification:

$$y_{pdt} = \sum_t \beta_t (\theta_t \times Islamic_{pd}) + X_{d0} \theta_t + \eta_{pt} + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{pdt}, \quad (2)$$

where I replace  $Post_t$  in Equation 1 with year dummies and use 1973 as the omitted category. The remaining specification stays the same as in Equation 1. My main outcome is the vote share of Islamist parties. Therefore, I would expect  $\beta_k > 0$  from the 1987 election onward—the first for which Islamic school graduates were of voting age, and had the adequate time for political mobilization—and  $\beta_k = 0$  for the 1969 election. As most Islamic schools had opened before the 1977 elections, the estimated coefficient for the 1977 election is not a pure pretrend estimate. It may still capture the effect of the opening of an Islamic school. However, it is unlikely to capture the effect of prolonged exposure because participating students were still below the voting age, and the period required to activate local mobilization may not have passed, as Islamic schools were new to the corresponding localities. Therefore, I would not expect the estimated  $\beta_k$  for 1977 to be as pronounced as that for later election years.



### 4.3 Electoral Consequences of Islamic School Access

Table 2 reports the results on electoral outcomes from the estimation of the difference-in-differences specification described in Equation 1. Column 1 of Table 2 shows that when I include district center and election-year fixed effects, access to Islamic schools is associated with a 1.87-percentage-point increase in the Islamic party vote share. The estimated effects remain robust after inclusion of province-by-year fixed effects in column 2 or of pretreatment characteristics interacted with election-year dummies as controls. In the most demanding specification in column 4 of Table 2, access to Islamic schools is associated with a 1.93-percentage-point increase in Islamic party vote share, or about 17% relative to the mean. This indicates that the Islamist party vote share experienced a faster increase in district centers with an Islamic school than in other district centers during the period when Islamist party vote shares were on the rise in

**Table 2:** Access to Islamic Schools and Electoral Outcomes

	Outcome: [...] Vote Share						
	(1)	Islamist Party (2)	(3)	(4)	Conservative (5)	Secularist (6)	Turnout (7)
Islamic x Post	1.87*** (0.53)	2.08*** (0.46)	1.93*** (0.52)	1.92*** (0.50)	0.27 (0.85)	-1.89** (0.79)	1.15* (0.69)
Mean Outcome	11.32	11.32	11.32	11.32	55.08	30.12	76.61
R <sup>2</sup>	0.673	0.806	0.806	0.864	0.767	0.812	0.870
N	4065	4065	4045	4045	4045	4045	4045
Clusters	813	813	809	809	809	809	809
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year FE	✓						
Province-by-Year FE		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population and Market Access			✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Controls				✓	✓	✓	✓


*Notes:* This table reports estimates  $\beta$  in equation (1) for electoral outcomes. Islamic refers to district centers with an Islamic school in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. Post is a dummy that takes value 1 for elections held in 1987 or later and value 0 for previous elections. 1977 election is excluded from the main specification. Population and market access includes the log of the 1970 district center population sizes and a measure for market access interacted with election-year dummies. Political controls include the 1973 vote shares of each parties and turnout rates interacted with election-year dummies.

\*p<0.1, \*\*p<0.05, \*\*\*p<0.01. Robust standard errors clustered at the district center level.

Turkey. Overall, access to Islamic schools explains about 30% of the surge in Islamist party support in district centers between 1973 and 1995, suggesting that Islamic schools were a crucial driving force behind the success of the Islamist party in treated localities.

To corroborate these findings, Figure 3 presents my event-study estimates showing the dynamics of the treatment effects on the Islamist party vote share in the general elections.<sup>8</sup> I use 1973 as the reference category and report estimates without control variables and those allowing for differential trends by province, pretreatment population and market access, and pretreatment electoral outcomes of the district center. I find no clear pretrends

**Figure 3: Islamic Schools and Elections – Islamist Party Support**



*Notes:* This figure reports election-year-specific estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 2 on a balanced district-center-year panel.  $Islamic_d$  is a dummy indicating Islamic school availability in district center  $d$  in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. The 1973 election was the last just prior to Islamic school expansion and serves as the reference election. The elections in 1987 is the first in which exposed cohorts would have been eligible to vote. All specifications includes district center fixed effects and election-year fixed effects. In some specifications, I sequentially include province-by-election-year fixed effects and a full set of pretreatment observable characteristics of district centers interacted with election-year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district center level.

in all specifications. The coefficients of the 1969 elections on the Islamist party vote


<sup>8</sup>I present estimates including long term elections in Appendix Figure A.3 and A.4

shares are centered around 0 and statistically highly nonsignificant. This provides supportive evidence on the identifying parallel trends assumption, as there are no pretreatment differences in Islamist party vote shares. Even though most Islamic schools opened between the 1973 and 1977 elections, the estimate for the 1977 election is still close to 0 and statistically nonsignificant. This indicates that there was no imminent effect of the provision of Islamic schools. Starting from the 1987 elections, the estimates become positive and statistically significant with an increasing trend. These results suggest that access to Islamic schools increased the Islamist party vote share after prolonged exposure to these schools, when graduates of Islamic schools came of voting age.

Columns 5-7 of Table 2 present the estimated effects of exposure to Islamic schools for secularist center-left and conservative right-wing vote shares and turnout rates under the most demanding specification. Columns 5 and 6 show that secularist center-left parties experienced a faster decrease in vote shares in treated district centers after Islamic school access while conservative center-right parties maintained their support. Column 7 suggests that access to Islamic schools is associated with a marginal increase in voter turnout in treated district centers. To explore the dynamics of the treatment effects, I present my event-study estimates for the related electoral outcomes in Figure 4. This figure reveals heterogeneity in the treatment effects across election years. In panel b, there is evidence that the decrease in the secular center-left vote share is partly driven by pretreatment differences, although there is a sizeable decrease for the 1991 and 1995 elections. In panel a, the estimated coefficients for 1987 and 1991 are negative for conservative parties yet estimated imprecisely. Panel c also shows that there is a pretreatment difference in voter turnout in favor of the comparison group, yet the difference disappears after treatment, and there is no systematic treatment effect for fully treated election years relative to the 1973 elections.

These findings suggest that access to Islamic schools had favorable consequences for

**Figure 4: Islamic Schools and Elections – Other Outcomes**



*Notes:* This figure reports election-year-specific estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 2 on a balanced district-center-year panel.  $Islamic_d$  is a dummy indicating Islamic school availability in district center  $d$  in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. The 1973 election was the last just prior to Islamic school expansion and serves as the reference election. The elections in 1987 is the first in which exposed cohorts would have been eligible to vote. All specifications includes district center fixed effects and election-year fixed effects. In some specifications, I sequentially include province-by-election-year fixed effects and a full set of pretreatment observable characteristics of district centers interacted with election-year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district center level.

the Islamist party. While conservative party vote shares remained similar and the secularist party experienced a decrease in its vote share, there is notable heterogeneity in treatment effects across election years. Nevertheless, on average, the Islamist party decreased its vote margin vis-à-vis other parties in district centers with Islamic schools relative to district centers in the comparison group.

#### 4.4 Heterogeneity Analysis

This section examines heterogeneity in the treatment effects to explore whether certain municipality characteristics play a role in the magnitude of the results. To empirically

investigate this, I estimate the following specification where, depending on the pretreatment municipality characteristics under investigation, specific variables are interacted with Islamic school access:

$$y_{pdt} = \beta_1(Post_t \times Islamic_{pd}) + \beta_2(E_{d0} \times Islamic_{pd}) + \beta_3(E_{d0} \times \theta_t) + \beta_4(E_{d0} \times Post_t \times Islamic_{pd}) + X_{d0}\theta_t + \eta_{pt} + \gamma_d + \delta_t + \epsilon_{pdt}, \quad (3)$$

where the notation used in Section 4.2 applies.  $E_{d0}$  is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a particular time-invariant pretreatment demographic characteristic or political condition of district center  $i$  is greater than the sample's median or top quartile value, depending on the specification under investigation. Note that the standalone  $E_{d0}$  is omitted from Equation 3 because district center fixed effects and all relevant double interactions are included. Here, the only outcome of interest is the Islamist party vote share, and everything else remains the same as the specification in Equation 1. The main coefficient of interest is  $\beta_4$ , the one associated with the triple-interaction term.

First, I investigate whether there is heterogeneity in the effects by the population size of district centers and provide the results in Table 3. Columns 1 and 2 show no differential impact of Islamic school access by the initial population size of district centers. Although the triple-interaction term is negative, it is highly nonsignificant.

Next, I explore whether there are heterogeneous effects by initial political conditions. In the first case,  $E_{d0}$  indicates whether right-wing parties' win margin against left-wing parties is above the median or in the top quartile. Column 1 of Table 3 shows that the impact of Islamic school access was more pronounced in areas that were right-wing strongholds. In the second case,  $E_{d0}$  indicates whether initial political support for different party classifications—namely, Islamist, conservative right, and secularist center-left—is above their median support in the 1973 elections. Column 1 of Table 4 provides suggestive evidence that the effect of access to Islamic schools was qualitatively higher in areas where the Islamist party initially had higher support, while there is no

**Table 3: Heterogeneous Results on Islamist Party Support**

	Outcome: [...] Vote Share			
	(1)	Islamist Party (2)	(3)	(4)
Islamic x Post	2.325*** (0.748)	1.988*** (0.595)	1.279** (0.572)	1.207** (0.508)
Urban Above Median x Islamic x Post	-0.931 (0.936)			
Urban Above 75 pct. x Islamic x Post		-0.452 (0.979)		
Right Win Margin Above Median x Islamic x Post			1.319 (0.853)	
Right Win Margin Above 75 pct. x Islamic x Post				3.069** (1.189)
$R^2$	0.865	0.864	0.864	0.865
N	4045	4045	4045	4045
Clusters	809	809	809	809
District FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Province-by-Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Population and Market Access	✓	✓	✓	✓
Political Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of equation 3 for Islamist party vote share. Islamic refers to district centers with an Islamic school in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. Post is a dummy that takes value 1 for elections held in 1987 or later and value 0 for previous elections. 1977 election is excluded from the main specification. Population and market access includes the log of the 1970 district center population sizes and a measure for market access interacted with election-year dummies. Political controls include the 1973 vote shares of each parties and turnout rates interacted with election-year dummies. See section 4.4 for further information on heterogeneity related variables.

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered by district center of residence.

differential effect by the initial strength of conservative parties. Column 3 further points out that the Islamist party's increase was faster in district centers with low secularist center-left support. Overall, the heterogeneity analysis of the treatment effects reveals that the increase in Islamist party support was faster in places with initial right-wing strongholds with lower attachment to secularist parties.

**Table 4:** Heterogeneous Results on Islamist Party Support by Initial Party Strength

	Outcome: [...] Vote Share		
	Islamist Party		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Islamic x Post	1.103** (0.507)	1.955*** (0.644)	2.775*** (0.757)
1973 Islamist V.S. Above Median x Islamic x Post	1.459* (0.843)		
1973 Center-right V.S. Above Median x Islamic x Post		-0.070 (0.848)	
1973 Center-left V.S. Above Median x Islamic x Post			-1.611* (0.864)
$R^2$	0.865	0.864	0.864
N	4045	4045	4045
Clusters	809	809	809
District FE	✓	✓	✓
Province-by-Year FE	✓	✓	✓
Population and Market Access	✓	✓	✓
Political Controls	✓	✓	✓

*Notes:* This table reports estimates of equation 3 for Islamist party vote share. Islamic refers to district centers with an Islamic school in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. Post is a dummy that takes value 1 for elections held in 1987 or later and value 0 for previous elections. 1977 election is excluded from the main specification. Population and market access includes the log of the 1970 district center population sizes and a measure for market access interacted with election-year dummies. Political controls include the 1973 vote shares of each parties and turnout rates interacted with election-year dummies. See section 4.4 for further information on heterogeneity related variables.

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered by district center of residence.

## 5 Alternative Explanations and Robustness Checks

### 5.1 Islamic Brotherhoods

One potential explanation for the increase in the Islamist party vote-share is the increased presence of Islamic brotherhoods (tarikats) in the public sphere after the 1980 coup. The military junta promoted a new ideology called “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” to tame ideological polarization and unrest between nationalist and far-left factions (Yavuz, 1997). This paved the way for Islamic brotherhoods and organizations to increase their visibility and activities in public. If Islamic schools are located in district centers with a

higher Islamic brotherhood presence, it is possible that the changes in Islamist party support were due to Islamic brotherhood activity and its role in boosting Islamism.

As I showed in the previous subsection, trends in Islamism, proxied by the share of Muslim male names, remained unchanged throughout my analysis period. Therefore, the increasing presence of Islamic brotherhoods was not reflected in a differential increase in Islamism between treated and comparison district centers. However, it is possible that Islamic brotherhoods may have affected electoral support for the Islamist party through other channels, including welfare provision. Although there is no extensive public data on Islamic brotherhoods' presence and activities at the district-center level, I argue that the Islamist party vote share in the 1973 general elections is a good proxy for this presence. The "partification" of the Milli Görüs movement was a project promoted by a cleric leader within Nakshibendi Tarikat, the most prominent and influential Islamic brotherhood in Turkey (Yavuz, 1997). Islamic brotherhoods actively supported the Islamist NOS party in the 1973 elections. Notice that, the share of Islamist party votes in 1973 elections is already included as a control by interacting with election-year dummies in my electoral analysis in equation 1. This allows district centers with different pretreatment levels of Islamist party support to have differential trends over time. The estimate remains similar to the baseline as seen in Column 4 of Table 1 and Figure 3, indicating that differential trends in areas with higher pretreatment Islamist party support do not drive my results.

## **5.2 Economic Liberalization and Rising Inequality**

Turkey underwent an extensive economic liberalization process during the 1980s, which led to increased economic activity and rising inequality within society (Aricanli and Rodrik, 1990). Given these circumstances of the period, the Islamist Welfare Party centered its rhetoric on economic development and rising inequality in its party agenda. They introduced a new party manifesto named the "Just Order" (Adil Düzen) that focused primarily on addressing economic and social inequalities in society and put less



emphasis on Islamism (Yavuz, 1997). It was one of the factors behind the Welfare Party's success in attracting widespread support from different segments of society during the 1990s. If Islamic schools opened in areas affected differentially by economic liberalization and rising inequality during the 1980s, this might bias my estimates on the impact of Islamic schools on electoral outcomes. Islamic schools were also located in relatively more populous and urbanized district centers that may have had differential effects of economic liberalization.

To address this possibility, I conduct several robustness checks. First, I construct a measure of market access for every district center. The market access of district center  $i$  is defined as  $MA_i = \sum_j (P_j / \tau_{ij}^\sigma)$ , with  $P_j$  being the population of district center  $j \neq i$ ,  $\tau_{ij}$  the Euclidian distance between district center  $i$  and district center  $j$ , and  $\sigma = 3.8$ , as in Donaldson (2017). This market access measure, together with natural log of 1970 population size, is included as control into equation 1 by interacting with election-year dummies. The estimate is robust to the inclusion of market access as a control as presented in Column 3 of Table 1 and in Figure 3, indicating that district centers that are well connected to markets or more populous and urbanized district do not drive my results. In the second and third rows of 5, I exclude district centers with population sizes smaller than 3000 and larger than 30000 to verify that substantially smaller or larger localities do not drive my results, and the coefficients remain similar to the baseline.

### 5.3 Geographic Sorting

Next, I examine whether my results can be explained by geographic sorting. Turkey has been experiencing a pattern of migration from rural areas to more urbanized towns and cities since the 1950s. If voters who were more likely to vote in favor of Islamist parties were also more likely to migrate to district centers with an Islamic school or migrate away from other district centers, my results could be partially explained by geographic sorting. To investigate this issue further, I follow an exercise proposed by Acharya et al. (2016)

and Williams (2017) that examines observable differences in characteristics of those who migrated out of (or into) the localities of interest. For this exercise, I use the 1990 5% sample obtained from the Turkish Statistical Institute. This sample provides information about a respondent's current locality of residence as well as the locality of residence five years prior to the census. This allows me to identify individuals who migrated from (to) each district center. Then, I test for differences in observable attributes of those mobile individuals relative to those of stayers. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:

$$\begin{aligned} Attributes_{idp} = & \gamma_1 Out(in) - migrant_i + \gamma_2 Islamic_{ipd} + \gamma_3 Out(in) - migrant_i \times Islamic_{ipd}^{1985} \\ & + \gamma_4 (X^{1985}d0) + \delta_p^{1985} + \epsilon_{idp}, \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where  $Attributes_{idp}$  corresponds to various observable characteristics of individual  $i$  from district center  $d$  in province  $p$  and  $Out(In) - Migrant_i$  is an indicator variable for whether the individual migrated out of (into) a district center.  $X_{ipd}^{1985}$  corresponds to the pretreatment controls for the district center where the individual resided in 1985, while  $\delta_p^{1985}$  corresponds to fixed effects for the district center of residence in 1985. The coefficient of interest here is  $w$ , which captures potential differences between those who migrated out of (into) and those who remained in treated district centers relative to the corresponding differences for comparison district centers. Table 5 panel a presents the results from equation 4 and shows no systematic differences between migrants from treated district centers and stayers relative to their counterparts in comparison district centers on selected attributes, except for age.

Panel b of Table 5 shows the results for individuals who migrated into district centers obtained by replacing an individual's 1985 locality of residence with her 1990 district center of residence in equation 4. The results also show no difference between those who migrated into treated district centers and stayers compared to their counterparts in

**Table 5: Geographic Sorting**

Panel A. Out-Migrants vs. Stayers

Dependent Variable:	Age (1)	Female (2)	$\geq$ Jun. High Degree (3)	Any Degree (4)	Literate (5)	Worked Last Week (6)	Rent (7)
Islamic x Out-Migrant Status	-0.273 (0.392)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.004 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.008)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.010 (0.035)
$R^2$	0.019	0.001	0.028	0.045	0.053	0.010	0.058
N	848775	849501	848996	848996	849364	715864	784545
Clusters	802	802	802	802	802	802	802
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-treatment Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Panel B. In-Migrants vs. Stayers

Dependent Variable:	Age (1)	Female (2)	$\geq$ Jun. High Degree (3)	Any Degree (4)	Literate (5)	Worked Last Week (6)	Rent (7)
Islamic x In-Migrant Status	-0.394* (0.221)	0.002 (0.006)	-0.005 (0.022)	-0.007 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.009)	0.009 (0.021)
$R^2$	0.017	0.001	0.024	0.042	0.048	0.010	0.067
N	853734	854450	853964	853964	854339	720159	788102
Clusters	802	802	802	802	802	802	802
Province FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Pre-treatment Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Notes: This table reports estimates of equation (4). Islamic refers to district centers with an Islamic school in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1974.  $Out(In) - Migrant_i$  is an indicator variable for whether the individual out(in)-migrated from(to) a district center.  $X_{ipd}^{1985}$  corresponds to the pre-treatment controls for the district center where the individual resided in 1985, while  $\delta_p^{1985}$  corresponds to fixed effects for the district center of residence in 1985. Pre-treatment controls include log of the 1970 district center population sizes and market access, and the 1973 vote shares of each parties and turnout rates.

\* $p < 0.1$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors clustered by district center of residence.


comparison district centers. Taken together, these findings suggest that geographic sorting is unlikely to explain my results on the faster increase in Islamist party vote shares in treated district centers.

## 5.4 Other Robustness Checks

I perform several additional robustness checks on my primary outcome of interest, namely, the Islamist party vote share, and report them in Figure 5. In the forth row, I include district centers with an Islamic schools before the 1973 expansion as treated in all elections. I include contemporary time-invariant —possibly bad— controls such as education levels, labor force participation and unemployment rate for individuals over age 25 interacted with election-year dummies in the fifth row. In the sixth row, I exclude 1969 where Milli Gorus did not participate elections as a party. In the seventh row, I

exclude the 1991 elections, in which the Islamist party formed an electoral alliance with two other nationalist right-wing parties. Eighth row includes the 1977 elections as treated. Ninth row exclude the independents in my 1969 Islamist party classification.

**Figure 5: Other Robustness Checks**



*Notes:* This figure presents the estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 1 from several robustness checks in panel A for Islamist party vote shares. See Table 2 for details related to specification.

In the last row, I weight the regression with population sizes in 1970. The estimates remain similar to the baseline for all robustness checks presented in this section. Finally, in Appendix Figure A.5, I drop a single region at a time from the sample to verify that outlier regions do not drive the estimates, and the results remain robust.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

This paper asks how access to religious schools affects electoral outcomes. I exploit the openings of Islamic schools in more than three hundred Turkish district centers between

1974 and 1980 and study their impact on electoral outcomes over the period between 1973 and 1995. I find that after school openings, the Islamist party vote share is about 1.9 percentage points higher, on average, in district centers with an Islamic school than in those without. I find no significant effect in the first election held after school openings in 1977, indicating that school openings alone were not effective in increasing support for the Islamist party in the very short run. The positive impact started to emerge as the first affected student cohorts came of voting age, about ten years after the Islamic school openings. I further provide evidence that economic liberalization, rising inequality, and the presence of Islamic brotherhoods do not drive my results.

My findings provide novel evidence on the political motives behind state actors' provision of religious educational institutions. Political entities with religious platforms may want to promote religious schooling to pave their way to power or reinforce their voter base. In several speeches made since 2012, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the Islamist ruling party, has voiced his desire to raise pious generations. Since then, the promotion and expansion of Islamic schooling have become a central policy in the AKP's pursuit of raising pious youth who are future electors. Therefore, my findings on the link between religious schooling and political behavior have important implications that the ruling power can translate into new policies and institutions favorable to religious politics.

At this point, it is worth mentioning that there are several contextual differences between the Islamic school expansions of the 1970s and 2010s. While the expansion of the Islamic school network in the mid-1970s resulted from a bottom-up community movement, contemporary Turkey has been experiencing a top-down expansion of the Islamic school network since 2013 under Islamist AKP rule. There are also temporal differences between these two expansions. After the 1960s, like many other Muslim countries, Turkey experienced a politicization of Islam and a widening of popular support for Islamist parties. Since then, Turkey has been experiencing a secular

downward trend in individual religiosity, and political Islam has been losing ground since the mid-2010s. The role that the internet and social media play in facilitating access to information is another important counter-factor that may complicate the effectiveness of Islamic schools in shaping the identity of students and leveraging it into electoral support for Islamist parties. The findings of this paper, therefore, call for analysis under further scrutiny in different contexts.

The implications of my findings also highlight two additional areas of future inquiry. One outstanding question is whether we would see a similar effect of religious schools from other religious denominations. Increasing populism and polarization along social and cultural lines may motivate politicians to utilize (or disutilize) religious schools based on their desire to secure fresh support from the upcoming generations in some contexts. Secondly, future research should address questions on the mechanisms through which the effect of religious schools on electoral support operates.

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


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
## A Online Appendix - Additional Results

Figure A.1: Locations of Islamic Schools




*Notes:* Map of Turkey showing the geographic locations of Islamic schools in 1980. Each dot represents a district center as of 1990.

**Figure A.2: Relation between 1969 and 1973 Electoral Outcomes**




*Notes:* This figure shows the bivariate relationship between selected electoral outcomes of the 1969 and 1973 elections.

**Figure A.3:** Islamic Schools and Elections – Islamist Party Support in the Long Term




*Notes:* This figure reports election-year-specific estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 2 on a balanced district-center-year panel.  $Islamic_d$  is a dummy indicating Islamic school availability in district center  $d$  in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. The 1973 election was the last just prior to Islamic school expansion and serves as the reference election. The elections in 1987 is the first in which exposed cohorts would have been eligible to vote. All specifications includes district center fixed effects and election-year fixed effects. In some specifications, I sequentially include province-by-election-year fixed effects and a full set of pretreatment observable characteristics of district centers interacted with election-year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district center level.

**Figure A.4: Islamic Schools and Elections – Other Outcomes in the Longer Term**



*Notes:* This figure reports election-year-specific estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 2 on a balanced district-center-year panel.  $Islamic_d$  is a dummy indicating Islamic school availability in district center  $d$  in 1980, excluding district centers with an Islamic school prior to 1973. The 1973 election was the last just prior to Islamic school expansion and serves as the reference election. The elections in 1987 is the first in which exposed cohorts would have been eligible to vote. All specifications includes district center fixed effects and election-year fixed effects. In some specifications, I sequentially include province-by-election-year fixed effects and a full set of pretreatment observable characteristics of district centers interacted with election-year dummies. Standard errors clustered at the district center level.

**Figure A.5: Leave One Region Out at a Time**



*Notes:* This figure presents the estimates of  $\beta$  in equation 1 leaving one NUTS1 region out at a time. See Table 2 for details related to specification.